Last updated: September 11, 2026 · Reviewed and improved in place, not re-published as a new post
Where things stand. Syria is Ankara's most active front. On 6 August, Türkiye and Syria agreed to set up a High-Level Coordination Council to deepen political, economic and infrastructure cooperation. Under a separate August 2025 memorandum, Türkiye trains and helps equip Syria's army; the memorandum does not provide for Turkish bases. On 18 August, Israel struck the Abu al-Duhur airbase in Idlib province. Israel's Prime Minister's Office said a Turkish deployment there "would pose a threat to Israel's security." Ankara condemned the strikes as attacks that "violate its territorial integrity and unity," referring to Syria. Türkiye's Defence Ministry said no Turkish military delegation was at the base, and that it will keep supporting Syria's military capacity under a "single army" principle. Syria's foreign minister said Turkish officers had visited the base, but that there was "no Turkish military build-up." Parliament voted 467 to 87 on 10 August for a law setting the legal terms for PKK members. The PKK ended its 40-year armed campaign in May 2025 and announced in October 2025 that it was withdrawing its forces to northern Iraq.
Four things are unresolved. First, whether Turkish support for Syria's army stays at training and equipment or moves toward a presence at Syrian bases. Ankara and Damascus deny Israel's claim that Türkiye was seeking a military presence at the base. Second, whether a deconfliction mechanism emerges. After the August strike, US Special Envoy Tom Barrack announced work on a mechanism that would include Syria. Türkiye's Defence Ministry said on 27 August that Washington had made no formal request about the mechanism. Third, whether TRIPP — a planned transit route through Armenia that Azerbaijan's President calls the "Zangezur Corridor" — reaches construction. In July 2026 it was "in the document-preparation phase," with the implementing company expected to be 74% US-owned and 26% Armenian-owned. Fourth, whether parliament opens a path for President Erdoğan to stand again. Elections are due in 2028. The constitution lets him run again if parliament calls an early election, which needs 360 of 600 votes. The governing AKP and its MHP ally held 328 seats in July. On 11 September, Erdoğan spoke of "the approaching elections."
Türkiye's leverage is broad. Defence and aerospace exports reached $6.3 billion in January–August 2026, up 16.2% on a year earlier, the Presidency of Defence Industries says. Drone maker Baykar reported $2.2 billion in 2025 exports and TB2 export contracts with 36 countries. Since February 2022, Ankara has used the 1936 Montreux Convention to restrict warships passing the Turkish Straits. Verbal deals made that month halted the return of Russia's Black Sea Fleet warships to their bases, in exchange for non-littoral NATO countries agreeing not to pass through the Straits. Ankara hosted NATO's summit on 7–8 July, its second after Istanbul in 2004. On 7 August it signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan: "any armed attack against any one of the three states shall be regarded as an attack against them all." Two factors limit this leverage. The first is the economy. The central bank cut its policy rate to 37% in January and has held it there at five straight meetings, most recently on 10 September. Annual inflation was 31.51% in August, down from 31.75% in July. The ENAG group's alternative index put it at 49.03%. The lira stood at about 48.4 per dollar on 10 September, against 47.4 on 3 August. The second is the EU track. The Council declared accession talks at a standstill in 2018. On 17 June 2026 the European Parliament adopted, by 381 votes to 107, a report stating that conditions do not permit resuming them. Türkiye's Foreign Ministry rejected it as "flawed assessments based on misinformation and unfounded claims." Human Rights Watch calls the 407-defendant case against Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu "politically motivated"; Ankara says its judiciary "is not open to interference." On 11 September a court sentenced İmamoğlu to more than two years in a separate insult case.
The thesis holds most clearly in soft power. Culture and Tourism Minister Mehmet Nuri Ersoy says Turkish TV series exports exceeded $1 billion in 2025, reaching close to one billion viewers in nearly 170 countries. In hard power, the picture is mixed: a growing export base and a new defence pact sit alongside a contested position in Syria. The economy remains the binding constraint. In August the central bank raised its end-2026 inflation forecast to 28%, with 15% for end-2027 against a 5% medium-term target. Governor Fatih Karahan names elevated oil and gas prices as "one of the main upside risks." Watch the rate decisions on 22 October and 10 December, any Syria deconfliction talks, how the 10 August law is applied, and the Commission's next Türkiye report (the last came on 4 November 2025). Read the thesis as supported in influence-projection, but not yet backed by price stability or a revived EU track.
Issues Focus is compiled from primary official statements and institutional research, cross-checked against reputable reporting. It describes how power, capital, and institutions are moving. Entries are corrected and improved in place as the picture changes, rather than re-published as new posts. — See all Issues Focus segments