Last updated: September 11, 2026 · Reviewed and improved in place, not re-published as a new post
Where things stand. The African Union counts 55 member states, including the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. Colonial-era languages and currencies still shape how these states trade and align. The CFA franc zone covers 14 states: eight in the West African Economic and Monetary Union and six in the Central African CEMAC. Language and currency do not line up neatly. Guinea-Bissau and Equatorial Guinea use the CFA franc, yet both also belong to the Community of Portuguese Language Countries, alongside Angola, Cabo Verde, Mozambique and São Tomé and Príncipe. Both CFA francs keep a fixed euro parity, and the French Treasury commits to supply euros when needed. The Central African central bank still deposits part of its reserves in an operations account at the French Treasury. The West African central bank has had no such account since January 2020. On 19 July 2026, ECOWAS leaders restated their "firm commitment to the launch of the ECO in 2027". Only states that meet the convergence criteria will join the first group.
The sharpest break in West Africa now runs between ECOWAS and the Confederation of Sahel States (AES). Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger adopted the treaty creating the confederation in Niamey on 6 July 2024. Their withdrawal from ECOWAS took effect on 29 January 2025. The three states inaugurated a joint investment bank, the BCID-AES, in Bamako in December 2025. They launched a unified military force headquartered in Niamey the same month and enlarged it from 5,000 to 6,000 troops in February 2026. In June 2026 they deposited notices of withdrawal from the International Criminal Court's Rome Statute; each withdrawal takes effect one year after notice. On 24 August 2026 the confederation's 45-member parliament opened its first session in Niamey. ECOWAS has chosen to keep talking. Its July communiqué extended its chief negotiator's mandate to December 2026 and said talks with the three states will proceed "exclusively as a unified block". It also directed the President of the ECOWAS Commission to work with the AES towards "a pragmatic security cooperation mechanism". ECOWAS named General Birame Diop President of its Commission from 1 September 2026. The open test is whether the AES holds together under armed pressure. In Mali's 2026 fighting, the other two members "have failed to deploy forces under the group's regional defense agreement."
Outside powers are competing directly for what lies under African ground. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) mined 230,000 of the world's 310,000 tonnes of cobalt in 2025 and holds half of known reserves, according to the US Geological Survey. On 4 December 2025, Washington signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement with Kinshasa and a separate economic framework with Kigali, alongside the DRC-Rwanda Washington Accords. In January 2026, Congolese lawyers asked the DRC's Constitutional Court to rule that the US agreement needed approval by parliament or referendum. At a US Critical Minerals Ministerial in February 2026, Guinea and Morocco were among the countries that signed new bilateral critical minerals frameworks or memoranda of understanding with the United States. Beijing keeps its own strong position. China and the DRC reached a new mining agreement in March 2026, and China remains the DRC's biggest creditor. Armed groups also hold leverage on the ground. In Mali, the al-Qaeda-linked group JNIM declared a fuel blockade on 3 September 2025. More than 300 fuel tankers have since been destroyed, and fuel now reaches Bamako under military escort.
Demographics remain the continent's largest long-term story. Africa's population grew from 283 million in 1960 to more than 1.5 billion in 2024. A 2024 analysis by staff of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) projects 2.5 billion by 2050, or 28% of the world's people, up from 10% in 1960. The World Bank expects more than 620 million people to enter Africa's labour force by 2050. The same ECA analysis states plainly that "a demographic dividend is by no means guaranteed". Each year more than 10 million young people enter the African labour market, but current growth creates only about 3 million formal jobs. Of 304 million young workers, 104 million live in extremely poor households. The World Bank projects 4.1% growth for Sub-Saharan Africa in 2026. Key dates: ECOWAS's negotiating mandate with the AES runs to December 2026. Angola's ruling party holds its congress in December 2026. The Sahel states' ICC withdrawals take effect in June 2027. An outbreak of Bundibugyo-strain Ebola, declared in the DRC on 15 May 2026, had killed more than 2,000 people by 11 August, and no approved vaccine exists for this strain.
Côte d'Ivoire. Alassane Ouattara won a fourth term in October 2025 with 89.77% of the vote. Two leading rivals were excluded: Laurent Gbagbo was barred over a criminal conviction, and Tidjane Thiam was disqualified for having acquired French citizenship. The World Bank puts 2025 growth at 6.3% and projects 5.8% for 2026 if Middle East tensions persist. In his August 2026 independence-day address, Ouattara linked his development goals to the 2026–2030 National Development Plan. France has withdrawn its troops or handed over its military bases in Côte d'Ivoire, as it has in Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Abidjan keeps working ties with Bamako: in August 2026, Ivorian and Malian experts agreed a draft treaty fixing their shared border. Both states are expected to sign it before the end of 2026.
Nigeria. Bola Tinubu's government faces pressure from Washington alongside gains at home. In late 2025 the United States named Nigeria a "Country of Particular Concern" for religious freedom. Defence spending rose from ₦2.98 trillion in 2023 to ₦4.91 trillion in 2025. The World Bank puts 2025 growth at 4%. Nigeria's upstream regulator, the NUPRC, reported crude output of 1.56 million barrels a day in June 2026, the highest since April 2020. Nigeria told OPEC that output rose by 35,000 barrels a day to 1.573 million barrels a day in August 2026.
DRC. Two peace tracks run side by side, and neither has ended the fighting. The DRC and Rwanda signed a peace agreement in Washington on 27 June 2025 and reaffirmed it in the Washington Accords of 4 December 2025. The Oakland Institute reported more than 1,000 civilians killed in the months after the June signing. In the Qatar-led track, the DRC and the AFC/M23 armed group signed the Doha Framework on 15 November 2025. Talks in Switzerland from 17 to 21 August 2026 produced a roadmap with "sequenced steps and timelines" and a common method for reporting ceasefire violations. The conflict has displaced an estimated 5.3 million people. An Ebola outbreak has added a health emergency; the WHO declared it a public health emergency of international concern on 17 May 2026. The World Bank estimates growth at 5.5% in 2025 and projects an average of 5.1% for 2026–2028 as mining output growth slows. Kinshasa suspended cobalt exports from February to October 2025.
Angola. João Lourenço cannot run for a third presidential term in 2027. He still wants to keep control of the ruling MPLA party. Its December 2026 congress may be the real succession decision, because the head of the winning party's national list becomes president. Lourenço has not named a successor. The MPLA holds 124 seats in the National Assembly, short of the two-thirds majority a constitutional revision requires. The Lobito Corridor is Angola's main outside bet. It runs 1,300 km from the Copperbelt in the DRC and Zambia to Angola's Atlantic port of Lobito. The US International Development Finance Corporation has said its investments there "help secure reliable supply chains and prevent monopolization by China and other strategic competitors."
Morocco. Rabat's position on Western Sahara keeps gaining support. The territory is contested; the African Union counts the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic as a member. On 31 October 2025, UN Security Council Resolution 2797 renewed the MINURSO mission and named Morocco's 2007 autonomy proposal as the basis for negotiations. Morocco has made 31 October a new "Unity Day" holiday from 2026. On 2 August 2026, President Trump wrote to King Mohammed VI: "We recognise Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara." On 7 September 2026, Greece said it supports UN-led negotiations "based on the Moroccan proposal for autonomy." On 8 September, 40 states backed the plan at the UN Human Rights Council. At home, the GenZ212 protests of 2025 called for better health care, better education and an end to corruption. Security forces killed three people and arrested about 2,100. Morocco has also approved $32.5 billion in green hydrogen projects, with investors from the US, Spain, Germany, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, China and Morocco itself.
Egypt. The IMF approved a $1.8 billion disbursement for Egypt on 31 July 2026 after its seventh review. That brings total disbursements under its two IMF arrangements to about $7.3 billion. The Fund expects inflation to rise to 16.7% in the second half of 2026 and flags "elevated public debt". The Nile dispute has sharpened again. Ethiopia inaugurated its Grand Renaissance Dam on 9 September 2025, and Egypt took the issue to the UN Security Council that month. In March 2026, Ethiopia announced three more Blue Nile hydropower projects. In mid-August 2026, Ethiopia's water and energy minister said Ethiopia would "control the flows of the Nile". A government source in Cairo replied that "Egypt will not allow this to happen". Egypt continues to balance its partners. The IMF funds its reforms, while Russia's Rosatom builds the $25 billion El Dabaa nuclear plant, largely on a Russian state loan.
Ethiopia. The Grand Renaissance Dam, rated at 5,150 megawatts, is Africa's largest hydroelectric plant. Ethiopia sells electricity to Kenya, Sudan and Djibouti. Ethiopia and its downstream neighbours have no comprehensive agreement on the dam. Abiy Ahmed's Prosperity Party "comfortably won another parliamentary majority" in the June 2026 elections. No voting took place in Tigray. Polling was also not held in at least eight of Amhara's 138 constituencies because of insecurity. In May 2026, Tigray's main party moved to reassert control over the regional administration. On debt, Ethiopia reached a preliminary deal with key lenders on its $1 billion bond on 29 June 2026. A January 2026 deal had collapsed after official creditors objected. The World Bank projects 7.2% growth for 2025/26.
Congo-Brazzaville. Denis Sassou Nguesso, 82, won re-election on 15 March 2026 with 94.9% of the vote. He first took office in 1979 and returned in 1997 after losing the 1992 election. In 2015, constitutional changes removed presidential age and term limits. ISS Africa notes that opposition leaders Michel Mokoko and André Okombi Salissa were arrested for "undermining internal state security". Succession inside the ruling PCT is unsettled. ISS Africa sees the president's son, Denis-Christel Sassou Nguesso, as likely next in line, facing party rivals including Jean-Jacques Bouya. The new government of 25 April 2026 kept Anatole Collinet Makosso as prime minister and made Bouya deputy prime minister for infrastructure. Public debt stood at about 97.3% of GDP at end-2025, according to the World Bank-IMF debt analysis. At end-2024, debt owed to China, including commercial creditors, equalled 11.1% of GDP, a large share of external debt. China's Wing Wah signed a $23 billion deal in September 2025 to develop three oilfields. Eni shipped the first cargo from its Nguya floating LNG plant in February 2026, lifting Congo LNG capacity to 3 million tonnes a year. Ties with France have deep roots. Charles de Gaulle arrived in Brazzaville on 24 October 1940 and made it the capital of Free France until June 1943. At the Brazzaville Conference of January–February 1944, he first raised the prospect of emancipation for France's African colonies. Today the balance tilts toward Beijing. France's own foreign ministry reports that French investment in Congo fell 21% between 2020 and 2024, to €2.59 billion. China is now Congo's leading import and export partner, and France ranks third among its suppliers. Some 54 French subsidiaries still operate there.
Mali. Assimi Goïta's transition has no fixed end. In July 2025 he received a renewable five-year mandate, "as many times as necessary, until the pacification of the country". The authorities had dissolved all political parties in May 2025. The security picture changed on 25 April 2026. JNIM and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) launched coordinated attacks on Kidal, Bamako, Kati, Gao, Mopti and Sévaré. A car-bomb attack on his residence in Kati killed Defence Minister Sadio Camara. Russia's Africa Corps withdrew from Kidal, and the FLA and JNIM now hold Kidal, Tessalit and Tinzaouatène. A second wave of attacks followed on 5 July 2026. ACLED data show fatalities from militant attacks up 35% to 3,435 in the first seven months of 2026. In July 2026, fuel still reached Bamako only under armed escort. Barrick settled its dispute with Bamako in November 2025, and the government agreed to hand the Loulo-Gounkoto complex back to the company. The IMF projects 5.4% growth in 2026 and backs a "non-mining fiscal framework" to shield policy from commodity cycles.
Senegal. Senegal reached a turning point on debt on 1 September 2026. IMF staff agreed a new 36-month Extended Credit Facility worth about $2.2 billion, subject to Board approval. The same day, the finance ministry launched a debt treatment plan and said it will seek an enhanced version of the G20 Common Framework. Debt in CFA francs stays outside the plan. About $4.8 billion of Eurobonds falls inside it, and the government said it would pay the 13 September coupon on its 2048 bond. The plan follows the discovery of more than $11 billion in debt, based on end-2023 figures, that was missing from earlier data. President Bassirou Diomaye Faye dismissed Prime Minister Ousmane Sonko in late May 2026 and named economist Ahmadou Al Aminou Mohamed Lo in his place. Sonko's PASTEF, which holds 130 of 165 Assembly seats, then elected him speaker. In November 2025 Sonko had called restructured debt a "disgrace". Faye launched his own party, Kiiraay, in July 2026 and took over as ECOWAS chair on 19 July. The Sangomar oil field brought operator Woodside $1.287 billion in the first half of 2026. The bp-operated Greater Tortue Ahmeyim gas project, shared with Mauritania, has flowed gas since January 2025.
Equatorial Guinea. Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo took power in a 1979 coup and still leads the country. His son, Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue, is Vice President. Freedom House scores the country 5 out of 100 and rates it "Not Free". French courts convicted the Vice President of embezzlement and money laundering, and the conviction was upheld in July 2021. It sits at a crossroads of blocs: it uses the CFA franc and also belongs to the CPLP.
Gabon. Gabon has turned its 2023 coup into an elected order. A new constitution passed by referendum in November 2024. Brice Oligui Nguema, the transition leader, won the April 2025 presidential election. His Democratic Union of Builders then won more than 100 of 145 National Assembly seats in the September–October 2025 elections, while the former ruling PDG took 15. The economy remains fragile. The World Bank estimates 2025 growth at 2.5%, with ageing oilfields reducing output, and warns of "important fiscal and debt pressures". The state has taken a larger role in oil: the Gabon Oil Company used its pre-emption right to buy Assala Energy from Carlyle for $1.3 billion in June 2024. France's presence has shrunk rather than ended. About 1,200 French troops were stationed in Gabon a decade ago; now no more than 200 remain. The Libreville base and Djibouti are France's last permanent military bases in Africa.
Issues Focus is compiled from primary official statements and institutional research, cross-checked against reputable reporting. It describes how power, capital, and institutions are moving. Entries are corrected and improved in place as the picture changes, rather than re-published as new posts. — See all Issues Focus segments